Cartels
are agreements made between competitors with the aim of stifling or eliminating
competition. This is mainly done with the aim of maximising profits for the
members of such cartels. Cartels have been known to adversely affect the
resource allocation in the economies leading to gross underperformance of the
economies affected. This has led to an international consensus on the need to
limit the practices of cartels through appropriate legislations at both the
national and the international levels. This paper seeks to provide an overview
of the laws and regulatory measures taken to limit the activities of cartels.
It also creates understanding of cartels, their characteristics and their
effects on markets. This paper also highlights some of the challenges faced by
regulators in limiting cartel practices and seeks to make recommendations on
how these limitations can be overcome.
A cartel can be described as an explicit
agreement between competing businesses in a market to engage in practices that
limit competition between them in order to maximise gains accruing to
themselves at the expense of other market players (Gray, 2008). These
agreements mostly pertain to fixation of prices above the market equilibrium
levels, limit production to levels below the market equilibrium levels and
other practices such as marketing and market segmentation. Other practices may
include the allocation of territories, bid rigging, allocation of customers,
use of common sales agencies, and profit sharing (Richard, Campbell and Elles,
1966). Cartels mostly occur in industries with a relatively small number of producers
or sellers and almost always relates to a situation where these producers
manufacture homogenous products (Connor, 2008). The homogeneity of products
implies that competition can only be done based on pricing. This means that the
members can easily detect a violation whenever a member of the cartel lowers
their prices and gain on the market share of the others. The cost structure of
the cartel members also bear great significance as any differences in the
production cost structures may prompt the firms to pursue a different profit
maximisation strategy (Dick, 1996).
The stability of demand also affects the
operation and stability of cartels. Markets facing frequent demand fluctuations
present the opportunistic members of the cartels with the opportunity to
violate the cartel agreements and go undetected as the cartels may not be able
to attribute the fluctuating revenues to a violation by a member (Dick, 1996). The
main aim of cartel agreements is to increase the profitability of the members
by limiting the competition between them. Cartels can either be private or
public. Public cartels are protected by governments and may not be held legally
liable for their action as the government is involved in enforcing the cartel
agreements. Governments may establish cartels based on their assessment on the
need to stabilise prices and control the level of production. For instance, in
Japan, in the aluminium smelting, steel, and ship building industries
(Symeonidis, 2002). In the USA, public cartels were permitted in oil production
and coal mining during the Great Depression (Symeonidis, 2002). The same was
done in Germany in the sugar, tin, and coffee industries during the same period
(Symeonidis, 2002). On the other hand, private cartels are prohibited in most
countries with various legislations being enacted to limit their cartel
practices around the world.
The enactment of antitrust laws in most
nations proves a growing commitment internationally to curtail cartel practices
that may have an adverse effect in the economies in question. The
identification and limitation of the cartel practices is also a subject of
competition laws in many countries (Gray, 2008). However, the identification
and proof of the existence of cartels is often difficult due to the reluctance
of such market players to make use of formal agreements when engaging in
illegal collusions (Harding, 2003). Cartels originated in Germany in the 1880s
as the alliances of enterprises and spread to the UK and the USA in the 1930s
(Symeonidis, 2002). The adverse effects of these cartels prompted the creation
of the American led anti-cartel movement in the 1940s that aimed at banning the
practice on a global level (Konkurrensverket, 2001). The acknowledgement of the
need to limit cartel practices has dominated international thinking with most
countries enacting competition laws whose role include the identification and
limiting cartel behaviour in their economies.
Due to the fact that cartels can operate
internationally, most countries have factored the need to cooperate with other
countries in limiting cartel practices in their legislations. In the USA, the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 outlawed all agreements deemed to restrain
interstate and foreign trade (Konkurrensverket, 2001). The violations of the
Act are punishable as federal crimes. In the European Union, the outlawing of
cartel behaviour is contained in the article 81 of the treaty of Rome which was
later replaced by the 101 TFEU (Konkurrensverket, 2001). In the UK, the
Enterprise Act of 2002 and the Competition Act of 1998 legislate and provide
for identification and limiting of cartel practices within the UK (Gray, 2008).
Where the violating firms operate across the national borders within the EU,
the EU legislations are applied.
An extensive survey conducted on the
activities of cartels indicates that in the last century, cartel activities
have often led to a 25% increase in the prices of the products affected (Connor
and Lande, 2005). Cartels operating across national borders had a price
increase effect of about 28% with the domestic ones pushing prices upwards by
about 18% (Connor and Lande, 2005). Of all the cartels studies, over 90% often
led to significant changes in the prices of the subject products (Connor and
Lande, 2005). A popular example of international cartels is the OPEC which
controls the production and prices of oil among the oil producing countries
(Connor and Lande, 2005). This cartel has been responsible for some of the
worst price fluctuations in the energy industry in recent times. Another cartel
which operated between 1992 and 1997 among the producers of graphite electrode
involved the players agreeing to fix prices and allocate themselves markets
around the world (Konkurrensverket, 2001). The price increase of this product
in the United States alone was 60% over the duration of the collusion
(Konkurrensverket, 2001). Similar adverse effects were observed in the case of
lysine producers’ cartel which was in operation between 1992 and 1995
(Konkurrensverket, 2001). A recent study by OECD (Economic Co-operation and
Development) between 1996 and 2000 estimated the effective commerce affected by
16 cartels amounted to $55 billion worldwide with an average overcharging rate
of about 10% and an overall 20% harm to the economy (Gray, 2008). In their
report, OECD termed cartel behaviour as a criminal behaviour with no benefits
to the economy as a whole (Gray, 2008).
Markets performing at the optimum are
those where the allocation of resources is efficiently done through the forces
of competition in the market (Symeonidis, 2002). Where competition applies,
producers strive independently to attract buyers to buy their products through
price variations, product differentiation or other strategies as they may deem
fit. This is of course done with the aim of maximising profits. On the hand,
the buyers only buy products that provide them with the benefits they seek for
where one of the key determinants of the choice of products to buy is the price
of such a product. The equilibrium price is set as follows: while the buyers
prefer to buy at the prices that they feel optimises their benefits, the
sellers prefer to provide products at the highest price possible in order to
maximise their profits (Symeonidis, 2002). Since the buyers can only spend what
they view as the price optimising their benefits, they can only buy at a given
price. On their part, the sellers are forced to reduce their prices to the
price the consumers demand and would consequently lower the amount of goods to
be supplied at such a price. If demand increases and the prices go up, the
producers are at ease to supply more goods and where such goods exceed the
demand, the prices are pushed back to the equilibrium levels.
The existence of competition in markets
ensures that consumers can access a wide range of products at the best prices
achievable. The producers get the incentive to be innovative in order to meet
the quality and price expectations of the consumers. This leads to economic
development in the subject markets due to the resultant innovation of products
and business processes as the producers seek to outdo each other in providing
affordable value to the consumers (Symeonidis, 2002). The forces of competition
therefore become the most effective factors of resource allocation in the
market and leads to higher market efficiency. Any practices that tend to limit
the level of competition that can exist in the market tend to result in an
underperforming market (Sutton, 1991). An underperforming market can be
characterised by exorbitant prices that are higher than the consumers would
willingly spend for products under normal circumstances. It can also be
characterised by shortage of products where despite the existence of sufficient
demand, the producers tend to produce less products for one reason or another
(Symeonidis, 2002).
Underperforming markets also contain
various artificial barriers to entry that prevent new entrants into the markets
hence slowing down the rate at which such markets can grow (Morton, 1997). Even
though cartels have proven difficult to prove, their presence can be imputed based
on the characteristics of a given market. Markets that are perpetually hit by
shortage of goods may provide a likely indication that the dominant market
players are in a cartel. Similarity of prices (which are in most cases inflated)
among the market players who are expected to be competing on price may also
suggest the existence of a cartel. The absence of growth in a market through the
lack of entry of new market players may also suggest the existence of cartel
behaviour that has been designed to restrict the entry of potential competitors
into the market (Leventein and Suslow, 2006). Efficient markets yield untold
benefits to countries (through their contribution to the GDP, employment, and
economic growth and development) and it is the duty of governments to
facilitate such efficiency and limit the existence of players that may want to
engage in behaviour that may limit such efficiency (Symeonidis, 2002).
Cartels are not easy to prove due to the
shrewdness of the players involved who desist from making formal and traceable
agreements when engaging in such collusions. The principle of fair treatment
requires that evidence of cartel behaviour be proven beyond reasonable doubt
before the offending firms can be subject to any penalties under the law (Gray,
2008). This may be illustrated in the case of Wood Pulp 1993 versus the
Commission of the European Communities (hereafter referred to as ‘the
Commission’) (Competition law of the EC and UK, 2011).
Bleached sulphate pulp also referred to
as wood pulp is a wood-based product which is used in manufacturing paper
(Competition law of the EC and UK, 2011). It was produced by about 800 firms
scattered across 30 countries but mainly in United States, Canada, and Northern
Europe (Competition law of the EC and UK, 2011). About 50 of them supplied products
into the European Community. The prices for the products would be announced in
advanced and would be fixed per quarter and this announcement would be done by
the various producers either in writing or orally. Some of these producers were
members of an export cartel in the USA whose existence had been permitted
provided their actions only affected the exports as provided for by the
Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918. The end result of the pricing model adopted by these
producers was the uniform increase of prices. This went against the expectation
of the trial and error mode of pricing as the forces of demand and supply
interact to set the equilibrium prices. This is illustrated below:
Source:
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199237920/resources/maps_cases/case9_3.pdf
The commission therefore sought to
impose penalties to the producers affected upon which the Wood Pulp producers
launched an appeal which assumed a two-fold approach. Firstly, it challenged
the jurisdiction of the European Commission in view of the fact that most of
the producers were located outside the European Community. Secondly, it
disputed the basis for the penalties and denied any collusion between the wood
pulp producers in setting their prices. On the question of jurisdiction, it was
ruled that since the action took place within the boundaries of the European
Community, the Commission had the authority to undertake necessary actions if
evidence of cartel behaviour would be proven. Regarding the price fixation
charges, the court found that parallel movement of prices was not sufficient
evidence of collusion. The experts commissioned by the court to undertake
studies into the market structure of the industry found that it was
oligopolistic in nature and therefore players could easily monitor the actions
of the competitors with ease and take actions appropriately (Competition law of
the EC and UK, 2011).
According to them, market transparency
made competitors to refrain from being the first ones to raise their prices
because if they did, their competitors would simply refrain from doing the same
and thereby attract more customers. However, in the even that cost pressures
mounted to a level that the prices had to be raised and one supplier raised
their prices; their competitors would quickly follow soot leading to the kind
of price patterns observed by the European Commission. The court held that
where evidence of collusion was absent, no criminal liability could be
apportioned to the perceived offenders; especially where there was a plausible
explanation for the actions taken by such producers. This was unlike other
litigations where the Commission’s sanctions were upheld as in the case of ICI
versus the Commission (Konkurrensverket, 2001).
The decision arrived at in the Wood Pulp
underscored the maxim of fair treatment of alleged offenders. The implication
of the ruling is that it required any prosecuting parties to engage in the
strenuous exercise of finding hard evidence to prove collusion. This may be
seen as an impediment to the restriction of cartel behaviour due to the
perceived difficulty in obtaining hard evidence of collusion to the fact that
organisations would normally avoid engaging in written agreements where the
subject of such agreements is criminal in nature (Konkurrensverket, 2001). This
difficulty may have been the reason for the commission’s insistence that
parallel price movements should have been used as sufficient proof for
collusion. Had their bid succeeded, through the principle of jurisprudence, it
would have been easy to prove the existence of cartels by simply observing
market movements. Although this may have ensured that the fight against cartels
would be more effective, it would have constituted a grave injustice on those
perceived to engage in such practices (Konkurrensverket, 2001). For instance,
tow competitors who choose to dominate different sections of a market
geographically may be accused unnecessarily in engaging in cartel practices.
The court faulted the insistence of the Commission on price announcements and
cautioned that their approach was likely to amount to punishing such
announcements. The difficulty faced by regulatory bodies in restricting cartel
behaviour may be similar to those faced by the commission in the case above.
The need to protected suspected parties till proven guilty lays the burden of
proof on the prosecuting party. This requirement has seen many offenders go
free for lack of hard evidence, and in most cases, the regulatory agencies do
not even initiate disciplinary action (Brown-Kruse, Cronshaw and Schenk, 1993).
The perceived ineffectiveness of this approach has been the basis for the
generation of other approaches such as the structuring of the markets in a
manner that makes detection of cartel behaviour much easier as discussed below.
Cartels can be inhibited through law and
regulation with a significant measure of success. Most countries have enacted
laws to guarantee healthy competition among market player in their economies
and to identify and penalise any proven cartel behaviour by the producers in
such economies (Simon and Walker, 1999). For instance, in Australia, cartels
are limited through the provisions of the Trade Practices Amendment Bill of
2008 (Gray, 2008). In the UK, the same is regulated through the Enterprise Act
of 2002 and the Competition Act of 1998 (Gray, 2008). It is also subject of the
European Union’s regulations on anti-competitive behaviour in cases that extent
beyond their borders as outlined in the European Community Act of 1972
(Harstad, Martin and Norman, 1998). In the USA, Cartel behaviour is
criminalised under the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 with subsequent amendments
(Konkurrensverket, 2001). The anti-cartel legislation in the European Union is
contained in Article 81 of the Rome (Han, 2006). In section 1 of the article,
the law prohibits agreements or treaties between businesses and associations
that may inhibit trade between the member states with the aim of restricting or
distorting competition within such markets (Konkurrensverket, 2001). The act
singles out price fixing and market sharing and declares that any such
agreements would be void. The act however exempts collusions in technology and
distribution networks provided that they are not designed to restrict or
eliminate competition (Gray, 2008). In Australia, it is a criminal offense to
enter into a contract which has cartel elements in it with the aim of
dishonestly acquiring certain benefits. The Australian legislation points out
two key elements that must be satisfied for an agreement to be termed as a
cartel: firstly, there must be a purpose to give effect to price fixation,
output restriction, bid rigging, or customer allocation; and secondly, the
competition element must exist where the parties to the agreement would have
under normal circumstances been competitors (Gray, 2008). Individual liability
in such collusions is a penalty of $ 220,000 or five years imprisonment, or
both (Gray, 2008). At the corporate level, cartel behaviour is punished with a
fine of $ 10 million; $ 30 million where it can be proven that the corporation
accrued some benefits as a result of the offense; or 10% of the corporation’s
annual turnover (Gray, 2008). In the United States, such penalties extend to $
1 million for individuals with an improvement proviso of ten years; and a
penalty of up to $ 100 million for corporations (Konkurrensverket, 2001).
The authority of the regulatory bodies
in meting out penalties is also critical when it comes to discouraging the
thriving of cartels (Stocking and Watkins, 1949). This can be observed in the
United States where the regulatory body can impose heavy sanctions on the
offending parties and accord criminal responsibility to perpetuators without
further reference to other authorities (Konkurrensverket, 2001). The European
Commission on the other hand has limited powers in this regard
(Konkurrensverket, 2001). This Commission has no jurisdiction over individuals
and can only fine offending corporations. The fines must also be substantial to
ensure that companies suffer losses as a result of engaging in cartels. Where
the fines are light, the companies would prefer to continue with the practice
in full knowledge that the gains from the malpractice would definitely outweigh
any penalties to be imposed once apprehended. The determination of fines is
done in a transparent manner and is largely dependent on the gravity and the
duration of the offense. For instance, where the offense has lasted for about
10 years, the fines would start from 20 million Euros upwards
(Konkurrensverket, 2001). With the revision of the fining policy of the
European Union in 1997, the Commission has done some heavy finings to cartel
offenders as follows: in 1998, Volkswagen was fined 102 million Euros; in 1998,
signatories to the TACA (Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement) were fined 273
million Euros; and in 1999, 99 million Euros was fined on a group of steel
producers; and in 2000, producers of lysine were fined 110 million Euros
(Konkurrensverket, 2001). These penalties are certainly heavy enough to
restrict engagement in anti- cartel behaviour.
Regulatory bodies need to share
information across national borders in order to ensure early detection of
cartel behaviour by market players (Office of Fair Trading, 2011). These
information must however be handled with due care to ensure confidentiality and
integrity of the information. As such, caution must be taken to ensure that
whenever information is transmitted across the competition regulation agencies
in cooperating countries, the information can only be used for the purpose for
which it was obtained. Such a system is likely to work best in situations where
different countries have independent competition regulatory agencies while
still accountable to the regional authority as is the case in the European
Union (Schwalbe, 2010). The European Commission could cooperate with member
states’ agencies in ensuring that any suspicious patterns in the economies are
detected promptly. The nature of practices by colluding companies is such that
the information that could give evidence of cartel behaviour would never be
stored in the offices where the regulatory bodies could easily access them in
an inspection (Konkurrensverket, 2001). To combat cartels more effectively,
more powers need to be granted to the regulatory agencies to search for
documents more comprehensively and even inspect private residences of the key
players in the companies in order to fish out such evidence. This power is
currently lacking in the vast majority of countries fighting cartels in the
guise of protecting their citizens’ privacy. This element of inability to cover
private residences is a serious challenge to the fighting of cartels. Some
regions such as the European Union also have rules that impair the work of the
regulatory bodies. For instance, the Commission can only question suspected
offenders on the basis of uncovered documents and not on any other goings on in
the companies (Konkurrensverket, 2001). This is highly restrictive and the
Commission should be allowed to generally ask questions on the matter at hand.
The engagement of highly specialised
units in tracking down the cases of cartel behaviour can also add value to the
fight against these cartels. For instance, the setting up of the specialised
cartel unit by the European Commission in 1998 served to focus on efficient
investigations of cartels drawing from the extensive expertise of the members
of the unit in case handling (Konkurrensverket, 2001). This concentration also
enables such teams to link related happenings in the market with relative ease
and follow up cases that seem to warrant some measure of attention. The very
existence of such close attention to market movements may be in itself a
deterrent to cartel behaviour. When companies are aware that chances of them
being detected are high, they tend to avoid such practices in order to avoid
incurring unnecessary costs in terms of penalties and possible imprisonment of
their top executives (Konkurrensverket, 2001).
Legislation also plays a role in curbing
cartel behaviour based on its approach to responsibility levels in the crimes
committed (James and Yao, 1995). For instance, corporations do not engage in
collusion; it is the executives within those corporations that do. When penalties
for cartel practices are apportioned as a group responsibility where only the
corporations are made accountable, it may not be enough to stop such executives
to engage in such practices (James and Yao, 1995). It is the fear of being held
personally liable that most effectively deters executives from leading their
corporations down the path of cartel practices. This forms the main difference
between the United States and the European Union. While the European Commission
has no jurisdiction over individuals and can therefore not apportion criminal
liability, their US counterparts have been known to fine executives on a
personal level and even imprison some of the serious offenders
(Konkurrensverket, 2001). Cultivation of a vigilant environment by the
regulatory agencies can be a major deterrent to such practices.
Another role that could be played by the
regulatory agencies in uncovering and limiting the practices of cartels is
using leniency programs (Konkurrensverket, 2001). The leniency program was
embraced by the European Commission in 1997. The Commission is therefore less
experienced than their US counterparts who have been running their version of
the same, the Corporate Amnesty program since 1978 (Konkurrensverket, 2001).
These programs were developed in recognition of the fact that it was quite
challenging to prove the existence of cartels in the manner prescribed by the
courts which in the execution of their mandates sought to protect suspected
culprits from arbitrary punishments. Where the Commission starts an
investigation, a company that is part of the cartel under investigation can
discontinue its engagement with its colleagues and surrender all evidence in
its possession in exchange for a reprieve in the fines that would accrue to it.
This reduction would normally be between 50%-75% (Konkurrensverket, 2001).
Moreover, in the event that the Commission is yet to initiate investigations or
where they may not even be aware of the existence of a cartel, such a
cooperating company could get between 75%-100% of the penalties that would
normally accrue to them (Konkurrensverket, 2001). For this leniency to be
applied, the companies must show meaningful cooperation and should be able to
submit written statements and documents on such collusion. This approach has
been quite fruitful in uncovering cartels since it was started in 1996. Such
waivers and reductions are done on the premise that the public interest to be
realised by uncovering cartels is much greater than the amount of fines being
sacrificed to realise this greater good. The companies whose infringement was
penalised in deducted form under this program include British Sugar and Greek
Ferries in 1998 and the Seamless Steel Tubes in 1999 (Konkurrensverket, 2001).
In the United States, a similar program
is referred to as the Corporate Amnesty program which has been in effect since
1978 (Konkurrensverket, 2001). Under this program, volunteers of information
would be immune from criminal prosecution. This program was later reviewed in
1993 in a bid to improve its effectiveness (Konkurrensverket, 2001). In the
revised program, immunity was made automatic where no prior investigation was
in place. Secondly, corporations were also entitled to amnesty if they volunteered
crucial information even after investigations have already began. Thirdly,
executives were entitled to amnesty at any stage if they volunteered
information that led to the solving of the cases (Konkurrensverket, 2001). The
end result was the detection of cartels that led to accumulation of $ 1 billion
in form of fines between 1999 and 2000 (Konkurrensverket, 2001).
The limiting of cartel practices has
been a major preoccupation of many government agencies around the world. This
is due to the increasing acknowledgement of the adverse effects that these
cartels can have on the market economies. As has been cited in many cases, the
existence of cartels interferes with the efficient allocation of resources in
the market and therefore become a major stumbling block to economic growth and
development in the affected economies. Many countries have enacted laws that
are aimed at curbing harmful cartel practices in their economies. These include
the Competition Act in the UK, and article 81 of the European Union. The fight
against cartels is however not without challenges. One of the main challenges
relate to the requirement that the agencies produce hard evidence of the
existence of cartels before punishing the suspect companies. This proves
difficult due to the fact that business executives who are already aware of the
criminal nature of their endeavours may in most cases avoid written agreements,
and where such agreements are made, they would normally be kept discreetly out
of sight. This has prompted governments to come up with alternative ways of
ensuring detection and disbandment of such cartels. These alternative
approaches relate to use of amnesty programs and increase vigilance that make
potential offenders afraid of prompt detection in the event that they initiate
agreements of a cartel nature.
Brown-Kruse,
J., Cronshaw, M. B., Schenk, D. J., (1993). Theory and experiments on spatial
competition, Economic Inquiry, 31(1), pp. 139-165
Competition law of the EC and UK, 2011. Competition law of the EC and UK.
(Online) Available at:
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199237920/resources/maps_cases/case9_3.pdf
(Accessed 20 May 2011)
Connor, J. M., 2008. Global Price Fixing: 2nd
Paperback Edition. Heidelberg: Springer
Connor,
J. M., Lande, R. H., 2005. How high do cartels raise prices? Implications for
optimal cartel fines. Tulane Law Review,
80, pp. 513–570
Dick,
A. R., 1996. When are cartels stable contracts? Journal of Law and Economics, 39, pp. 241–83
Gray, A., 2008. Criminal
Sanctions for Cartel Behaviour. (Online) Available at:
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/ljj/editions/v8n2/pdf/5_Criminal_Sanctions_Cartel_Behaviour_GRAY.pdf
(Accessed 20 May 2011)
Han, J., 2006. Antitrust
and Sharing Information about Product Quality. (Online) Available at:
http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v73/summer/han.pdf (Accessed 20
May 2011)
Harding, 2003. Forging
the European Cartel Offense: the Supranational Regulation of the Business
Conspiracy. (Online) Available at: http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/3373/Forging%20the%20European%20Cartel%20Offence.pdf?sequence=1
(Accessed 21 May 2011)
Harstad,
R., Martin, S., Norman, H.T., 1998. Experimental
tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly, in Phlips L. (ed), Applied Industrial Organisation.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
James,
A. J., Yao, D. A., 1995. Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and
High-Technology Industries. Antitrust Law Journal, 64 (1), pp. 247-265
Konkurrensverket, 2001. Fighting Cartels: Why and How? (Online) Available at:
http://www.kkv.se/upload/filer/eng/publications/3rdnordic010412.pdf (Accessed
21 May 2011)
Levenstein,
M. C., Suslow, V. Y., 2006. What determines cartel success? Journal of Economic Literature, 64, pp. 43–95
Morton,
S. F., 1997. Entry and predation: British shipping cartels 1879–1929. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
6, PP. 679–724
Office of Fair Trading, 2011. Competition Act 1998. (Online) Available at:
http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/legal-powers/legal/competition-act-1998/
(Accessed 21 May 2011)
Richard, W., Campbell, A., Elles, N., 1966 The
Law of Restrictive Practices and Monopolies, 2nd edition, London: Sweet and
Maxwell
Schwalbe, U., 2010. Welfare Effects of Spartial Cartels. (Online) Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/schwalbe.pdf (Accessed
20 May 2011)
Simon, B., Walker, M., 1999. The Economics of EC
Competition Law. London: Sweet and Maxwell
Stocking,
G. W., Watkins, M. W., 1949. Cartels in
Action. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund
Sutton,
J., 1991. Sunk Costs and Market
Structure: Price Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of Concentration.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Symeonidis,
G., 2002. The Effects of Competition:
Cartel Policy and the Evolution of Strategy and Structure in British Industry.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
No comments:
Post a Comment